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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/614,431	07/07/2003	John K. Fraser	MA9658DIV1	7718
7590	03/30/2006		EXAMINER	
Kenton R. Mullins Stout, Uxa, Buyan & Mullins, LLP Suite 300 4 Venture Irvine, CA 92618			LANKFORD JR, LEON B	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			1651	
DATE MAILED: 03/30/2006				

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

<b>Office Action Summary</b>	<b>Application No.</b>	<b>Applicant(s)</b>
	10/614,431	FRASER ET AL.
	<b>Examiner</b>	<b>Art Unit</b>
	Leon Lankford	1651

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

### **Period for Reply**

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

## Status

1)  Responsive to communication(s) filed on 07 July 2003.

2a)  This action is **FINAL**.                            2b)  This action is non-final.

3)  Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

## **Disposition of Claims**

4)  Claim(s) 93-117 is/are pending in the application.  
4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.

5)  Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.

6)  Claim(s) 93-117 is/are rejected.

7)  Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.

8)  Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

## Application Papers

9)  The specification is objected to by the Examiner.

10)  The drawing(s) filed on 07 July 2003 is/are: a)  accepted or b)  objected to by the Examiner.

Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).

Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).

11)  The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

**Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119**

12)  Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).  
a)  All b)  Some \* c)  None of:  
1.  Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.  
2.  Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.  
3.  Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

\* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

**Attachment(s)**

1)  Notice of References Cited (PTO-892) 4)  Interview Summary (PTO-413)  
2)  Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948) Paper No(s)/Mail Date. \_\_\_\_.  
3)  Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)  
Paper No(s)/Mail Date \_\_\_\_.  
5)  Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)  
6)  Other: \_\_\_\_.

## DETAILED ACTION

### ***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112- second paragraph***

The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

Claims 93-117 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

Applicant claims a method of treating a patient but it is unclear for what. Applicant has failed to claim for what a patient is being treated and thus the claims do not particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. Claims 102 & 103 are also so vague as to make it unclear what the cells administration is to treat. Claim 104 does not have this problem.

Further, the “tissue removal system” is clearly critical to the claimed invention yet applicant does not detail; what this “system” is or how it is used. As claimed it is unclear if the system is a method or an apparatus.

It is unclear if the patient from whom the tissue is removed is the same as to who the cells are administered. Applicant should clarify.

The term “stem cells” in this particular case is indefinite. There are several types of multipotent cells which may be associated with adipose tissue and thus the intending scope of applicant’s claim is unclear. Applicant should more clearly define the cells in question.

Please note that the language of a claim must make it clear what subject matter the claim encompasses to adequately delineate its "metes and bounds". See, e.g., the following decisions: *In re Hammack*, 427 F 2d. 1378, 1382, 166 USPQ 204, 208 (CCPA 1970); *In re Venezia* 530 F 2d. 956, 958, 189 USPQ 149, 151 (CCPA 1976); *In re Goffe*, 526 F 2d. 1393, 1397, 188 USPQ 131, 135 (CCPA 1975); *In re Watson*, 517 F 2d. 465, 477, 186 USPQ 11, 20 (CCPA 1975); *In re Knowlton* 481 F 2d. 1357, 1366, 178 USPQ 486, 492 (CCPA 1973). The courts have also indicated that before claimed subject matter can properly be compared to the prior art, it is essential to know what the claims do in fact cover. See, e.g., the following decisions: *In re Steele*, 305 F 2d. 859, 134 USPQ 292 (CCPA 1962); *In re Moore* 439 F 2d. 1232, 169 USPQ 236 (CCPA 1969); *In re Merat*, 519 F 2d. 1390, 186 USPQ 471 (CCPA 1975).

#### *Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101*

35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

Claims 93-101 & 105-117 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention lacks patentable utility.

There is no specific and substantial utility to claimed invention. Applicant claims a "method of treating a patient" but does not claim to what end. What is being treated? A disease? A disorder? A treatment without a disclosed desired result can not be considered a specific substantial utility.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112- first paragraph***

Claims 93-101 & 105-117 are also rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph.

Specifically, since the claimed invention is not supported by either a substantial, specific asserted utility or a well established utility for the reasons set forth above, one skilled in the art clearly would not know how to use the claimed invention.

The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 93-117 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention or has enabled the claimed invention.

Applicant claims generically treating diseases of a very wide variety and etiology however the specification as originally filed does not provide an adequate written description to show possession of the entire scope of this invention. The written description requirement for a claimed genus may be satisfied through sufficient description of a representative number of species by actual reduction to practice, reduction to drawings, or by disclosure of relevant, identifying characteristics, i.e., structure or other physical and/or chemical properties, by

functional characteristics coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or by a combination of such identifying characteristics, sufficient to show the applicant was in possession of the claimed genus. Applicant has shown none of this. See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1406.

It follows that a discovery of stem cells in adipose tissue does not enable the treating of all cellular disease. Applicant's showing is too limited to be considered to enable treatment of the generically claimed conditions.

The breadth of claims must be based upon the predictability of the claimed subject matter and not on some standard of trial and error. To argue that one can make material embodiments of the invention and then test for those that work in the manner disclosed or that the instant claims only encompass the working embodiments is judicially unsound. Unless one has a reasonable expectation that any one material embodiment of the claimed invention would be more likely than not to function in the manner disclosed or the instant specification provides sufficient guidance to permit one to identify those embodiments which are more likely to work that not without actually making and testing them then the instant application does not support the breadth of the claims. In the instant case it is highly improbable that any of the encompassed diseases will more likely than not be treated in the manner disclosed and the instant specification does not provide the guidance needed to find diseases which can be treated.

The claims are essentially of limitless breadth. It is implied that so long as the specification provides one with the ability to test any particular embodiment which is encompassed by the material limitations of a claim, one can thereby distinguish between those embodiments which meet the functional limitations from those embodiments which don't. This

argument is not entirely without merit. However, the issue here is the breadth of the claims in light of the predictability of the art as determined by the number of working examples, the skill level of the artisan and the guidance presented in the instant specification and the prior art of record. This 'make and test' position is inconsistent with the decisions in *In re Fisher*, 427 F.2d 833, 166 USPQ 18 (CCPA 1970), *Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd.*, 13 USPQ2d, 1737 (1990), and *In re Wands*, 8 USPQ2d, 1400 (CAFC 1988). *In re Wands* stated that the factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation include (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art and, (8) the breadth of the claims.


Breadth alone is not the issue, however. *In re Fisher*, 427 F.2d 833, 166 USPQ 18 (CCPA 1970), held that "Inventor should be allowed to dominate future patentable inventions of others where those inventions were based in some way on his teachings, since such improvements while unobvious from his teachings, are still within his contribution, since improvement was made possible by his work; however, he must not be permitted to achieve this dominance by claims which are insufficiently supported and, hence, not in compliance with first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112; that paragraph requires that scope of claims must bear a reasonable correlation to scope of enablement provided by specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art; in cases involving predictable factors, such as mechanical or electrical elements, a single embodiment provides broad enablement in the sense that, once imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty and their performance characteristics predicted by resort to known

scientific law; in cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and physiological activity, scope of enablement varies inversely with degree of unpredictability of factors involved."

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Leon Lankford whose telephone number is 571-272-0917. The examiner can normally be reached on Mon-Thu 7:30-6.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Mike Wityshyn can be reached on 571-272-0926. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).



Leon B. Lankford Jr  
Primary Examiner  
Art Unit 1651